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Article 1

NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS LECTURES*
Philip A. Hart**
I. Introduction
I approached my visit here in a mixed mood. On the one hand, it is equally
a privilege and pleasure to help honor Father Hesburgh to whom these lectures
are so fittingly dedicated. Last year, former Chief Justice Warren reminded you
that I had once called the Civil Rights Commission the "common conscience of
the Nation."' If I was accurate, then I am sure no present or past member of the
Commission, including its pioneering Chairman John Hannah, would demur if
I add that for most Americans Father Hesburgh has become the voice of that
conscience.
Now that voice has been officially stilled; but Father Hesburgh will still be
heard from. His most recent eloquent plea for the long march toward racial
justice indicates he will still provide the voice of conscience, even now in his un2
accustomed role, if he will forgive the phrase, as a layman in the struggle.
When he left the Commission, three former staff directors, whose service
under him spanned almost his entire 15 years as a member and Chairman,
wrote: "We regret that the conclusion of Father Hesburgh's services with the
Commission was not marked with the honor he so richly deserves." 3 Knowing
Father Hesburgh, I doubt he regrets it. Indeed, I suspect he is not comfortable
with a lecture series in his honor either. Neither are needed to memorialize his
contribution to national sanity. As his three staff directors added: "The best
repayment to Father Hesburgh is to heed some of what he has been telling us
over the years."
And so it is. But a review of civil rights from a Congressional perspective
is also appropriate. For while the Commission served as our national conscience,
it has also been the strong right arm of Congress, as these lectures bear witness.
The Commission provided the solid factual foundation for every major civil
rights law in its lifetime.
My ambivalence toward beginning these lectures, nonetheless, springs froni
a sense that, inevitably, some will read about this program and react, claiming
that civil rights has been beaten to death as an issue, and that America should
move on to less divisive problems. While I have no great insights to offer for
these perplexing difficulties we face, my personal feeling on the matter is that
we must continue to ponder civil rights questions, or we will ultimately be unable
to address the other problems with a sure sense of purpose. We have made
These lectures were delivered at the Notre Dame Law School on April 5 and 6, 1973.
United States Senator from Michigan; A.B., 1934, Georgetown University; J.D., 1937,
University of Michigan.
1 Warren, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 NoTan DAmE LAwyER 14,
46 (1972).
2 Hesburgh, Even Good People Are Losing Heart, N. Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1973, at 31,
col. 4-6.
3 Letter from Berl Bernhard, Howard Glickstein, and William Taylor, to the Washington
Post, Dec. 7, 1972.
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significant strides to be sure. Yet, if the pace of progress is a guide, we will have
to dedicate our energies to civil rights for some time to come.
Let us consider a little history. In 1870, the fifteenth amendment was
ratified and Congress passed the so-called "Enforcement Act," a measure "to
Enforce the Rights of Citizens to Vote in All States."' One hundred years later,
Congress found it necessary to pass the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970
in an effort to ensure Negroes' full enjoyment of the franchise.
Progress has been won by the toil and dedication of many--often by the
sacrifice of lives of some who sought to serve the cause of freedom at home. But
with a historical perspective on the steep slope we climb, it is not surprising that
in 1968, the National Commission on Civil Disorders still warned:
Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-

separate and unequal.... This deepening racial division is not inevitable.
The movement apart can be reversed. Our principal task is to define that
choice and to press for a national resolution.
To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization

of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic
democratic values.6

In these lectures, I would like to explore this area with you from the perspective of Congress-a viewpoint necessarily reflecting the civil rights issue in
the nation as a whole.
Last year, Chief Justice Warren recounted a provocative history of race
relations in America, from its slave trade roots, through the agonies of Civil War
and Reconstruction, to the beginning of modem civil rights legislation and to the
landmark Supreme Court decisions of the past few decades.7
First, let me briefly review the civil rights legislation of the post-Civil War
era, as it foreshadowed the legislative outburst in our own time. Then I will
examine in more detail the passage of the present civil rights laws designed to
safeguard from discrimination every American's vote, his chance to work, his
home and his children's education. What choices were made, or accepted from
political necessity, in pursuit of these goals? What lessons were learned about
techniques which held promise and about the conditions for effective action?
Next, I will discuss the problems which arose as the legislation of the 1960's
was implemented: The Voting Rights Act illustrates the importance of congressional oversight to ensure useful legislation is not undermined. The EEOC's
history demonstrated shortcomings in the initial legislation and the difficulty of
strengthening it. In education, we saw the gradual pace of administrative enforcement quicken and then be overtaken by the courts and become embroiled in
a national controversy of still uncertain dimensions.
Finally, I will take a look at the future. What crossroads lie ahead for
school desegregation, fuller political participation, equal economic opportunity,

and open housing? What changes can we perceive in the public's attitude toward
4
5

Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 1401 (1870).
42 U.S.C. §§ 19736, 973c, 1973aa to 1973bb-4 (1970).

6
7

NAT'L ADvIsORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1968).
See Warren, supra note 1.

[Vol. 49:5]

NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS LECTURES

7

the cause of racial justice, as the problems become more complex and closer to
home?
II. Civil Rights History-Congressional Perspective
The initial issue in the treatment of black Americans was the great debate
over political treatment of slavery itself: first, at the Constitutional Convention,'
then in the struggle over the terms of incorporating new territory. The Missouri
Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854
all signified recognition that race relations remained a crucial aspect of political
power, as well as an everyday fact of life, in a rapidly expanding nation.'
During Reconstruction, Congress faced the task of completing its Civil War
objectives: Emancipation was ratified with the thirteenth amendment in 1865.
Slaves were free, but not yet clearly citizens with defined legal rights. Southern
states enacted the "Black Codes," detailed blueprints for official segregation
and subjugation.'
With the literal "reconstruction" of southern delegations to Congress and
statehouses, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments swiftly followed, establishing Negroes as citizens with the right to vote and to receive "Equal Protection of
the Laws."'
Simultaneously, Congress embarked on the measures known as the "Civil
Rights Laws." The Civil Rights Act of 1866 sought to place Negroes on an
equal footing with whites in their power to purchase property, to contract and
carry on other basic activity.'" This statute also outlawed interference with civil
rights by individuals acting "under color of law" or by private persons acting in
concert.'" This was the first heyday of civil rights legislation. A Voting Rights
Act followed,'" then laws prohibiting kidnap of former slaves and enforced
peonage. 5 Later, in 1875, Congress passed the first public accommodations law,
excluding only schools, cemeteries and churches, and guaranteeing Negroes jury
service.' 8
Then Reconstruction ended. In an era of reconciliation, and new political
patterns, all three branches of the federal government began the process of
retrenchment. A series of Supreme Court decisions, notably the Slaughter-House
Cases' and the Ciuil Rights Cases,' narrowly construed the rights guaranteed
to federal citizens and struck down the attempts to reach private action under
8 See J. MADIsoN, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 578-83, 598-99, (E.
Scott ed. 1893).

9

Id. at 23-25; Maslow and Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality,

20 U. CHI. L. R.v.363, 365-66 (1953).

10 Maslow and Robison, supra note 9, at 366-67; Warren, supra note 1, 28-29.
11 See J. TEN BRocx, EQUAL UNDER LAW, (1965) and E. McKMuac, ANDREW
AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960).
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 '(1866).
Id.
Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
Ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866); ch. 188, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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the fourteenth amendment. The Court also narrowed the scope of criminal
measures not struck down entirely.' 9
Following the controversial Hayes-Tilden election and the subsequent withdrawal of federal troops from the South by the President, Congress itself repealed
or narrowed many of its own enactments." Protection of voting rights was repealed in 189421 and further pruning continued for over a decade.2 2
As federal safeguards eroded, many states passed systematic programs to
suppress black voting, economic advance and public mingling with whites.
23
Where laws proved inadequate, terror and violence became commonplace.
The nation became preoccupied with industrial growth at home and hostilities
abroad and America turned its back on its new black citizens.
Following the First World War, layers of official segregation thickened, not
only in the South but throughout America. The resurgence of the Ku Klux
Klan brought sporadic congressional efforts to provide rudimentary protection
for Negroes-particularly an antilynching law.2" But that measure was to be
deferred until, ironically, its descendant was incorporated in one of the last civil
rights measures passed to date, the 1968 Civil Rights Act.25
Civil rights advances like those of the 1960's were hard to imagine during
the Great Depression. Blacks struggled for subsistence. Even as they did, new
federal agencies quietly adopted the official segregation of the land. The federal government put its own imprimatur on residential segregation when the Federal Housing Administration, in the 1930's and 1940's, formally restricted loans
to racially "homogeneous neighborhoods" in the "interest of stability." 2
'
Nevertheless, events were creating political preconditions for legislative success in Washington three decades later. The rural -depression sent streams of
blacks to seek work on the assembly lines and in the unskilled services enterprises
of northern cities. Poverty and discrimination combined to force blacks into
ghettos--starting a vicious cycle of indecent living conditions, poor health and
education, and poverty, but also beginning the role of a cohesive black vote in
urban politics.2"
World War II affected the attitudes of all Americans, although for some the
impact may have been inarticulated. Negroes learned that at least in a national
emergency, they might be accorded more opportunity to enter the economic
mainstream. And, not surprisingly, having helped the war effort, they would
look for greater concern from the government they had been asked to protect.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); see generally, Gressman,

The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
20 See C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION (1951).

21 Ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
22 One example is Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088.
23 See C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (rev. ed. 1968); Maslow and
Robison, supra note 9, 373, 386-87.
24
25

Maslow and Robison, supra note 9, at 380-84.
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.)

26

SENATE

(1968).

SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL

OPPORTUNITY,

EQUAL

92D

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 249 (Comm. Print 1973)
COMMITTEE]; see also J. JAvrrs, DISCRIMINATION-USA 144-45

27

A.

SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL

CONG., 2D SEss., TOWARDS
[hereinafter cited as SELECT

(1960).
424-30 (1960).
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For whites, the rhetoric of opposition to repression was one more reminder of
the gap between national promise and performance.
By the postwar period, the political power of the Negro's so-called swing
vote in certain congressional seats and the Electoral College was entrenched.
Negro political leaders, the Urban League and NAACP, labor and national
religious organizations joined to move civil rights toward the top of the national
agenda. The dozen years until the breakthrough of the sixties saw repeated
efforts to make the wartime Fair Employment Practices Committee a permanent
agency with enforcement power, to ban poll taxes and to bar federal aid to
segregated state programs.2"
The familiar pattern was action in the House, then delay or death in a
Senate controlled by southern Committee Chairmen and kept under the
Damocles Sword of the filibuster. As early as 1945, the House passed measures to
end the poll tax and create an FEPC. A 1950 House-passed FEPC bill was
filibustered in the Senate. Antilynching legislation never reached the House or
Senate floor. Renewed efforts in the intervening years failed, as did the first
efforts at antisegregation
riders to bills for housing and other federal construction
29
programs.
1948 brought a presidential commitment to civil rights. President Truman
called for an effective FEPC, antilynching laws, a Civil Rights Division in the
Justice Department, the poll tax ban, voting protection, and integration of
interstate transportation."' Stymied in Congress and confronted with the Dixiecrat bolt from his party, Truman nonetheless took significant steps by executive
order, putting the federal government for the first time since Reconstruction
squarely on the side of desegregation. 2 '
These developments also led to formation in 1949 of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, an alliance of civil rights, labor and religious groups and
other organizations dedicated to equal opportunity. The Conference, which
today comprises over 120 such organizations, has proven an extraordinarily
effective lobbying arm for civil rights in all the legislative battles of the past 20
years.
The Conference grew out of the National Committee for a Permanent
FEPC, organized by A. Philip Randolph during World War II. In the early
postwar years, the National Committee had focused on employment as the most
pressing black concern. Then when President Truman proposed his comprehensive civil rights agenda, there was a Mobilization March on Washington for
civil rights laws. The organizers of that mobilization and the national FEPC
Committee agreed that a permanent coalition was needed to coordinate lobbying
on behalf of a broader legislative program, and they created the Leadership
Conference.
The civil rights groups now turned their attention also to the procedural
brambles. The 21 Day Rule for circumventing the Rules Committee passed
28

1

CONGRESS AND THE NATION, CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC

29 Id.
30 Id.; see also COMM'N ON CrviL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE
31 Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (Comp. 1943-1948).

1615-26 (1965).
RI GHTS

(1947).
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the House in 1949.2 In 1951, Rule 22, requiring a two-thirds vote for Senate
cloture, was unsuccessfully attacked in the first of a long series of assaults."
Then the Supreme Court's 1956 decision in Brown. U.Board of Education3 4
burst upon Washington, producing in short order a Southern Manifesto by some
members of Congress and backing by others for the Powell Amendment to end
federal aid for segregated schools. However, these early desegregation riders
came in the midst of heightened debate over the federal government's role in
education. Some civil rights supporters felt compelled to oppose them for fear
they would doom any federal education bill. In fact, many Congressmen opposed
to federal education aid supported the rider in an effort to doom the education
bills; they then turned around and joined with Southerners to defeat the
amended bill on final passage. 5 The dilemma for those committed to both education and civil rights cautioned us against moral certitude about the "right"
course for civil rights supporters in such complex situations.
III. The Legislation of the Fifties and Sixties
A. 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts
In the 1956 election year, both parties offered civil rights measures. A
historic shift in that election of black voters to Republican ranks-forty percent
by some estimates-produced a united White House and bipartisan congressional
leadership drive for legislation. Pressure for a significant bill was strong. "
While public attention focused on the national debate over jury trials for
those charged with criminal contempt of court injunctions, the most significant
battle was fought over Title III of the administration's bill, which would have
permitted the Attorney General to seek injunctions against deprivation of any
civil rights. This was a far-reaching request, one which would have given the
Government a broad role in civil rights litigation, including suits to desegregate
the schools."
It was not clear whether there was enough support for cloture on Title III.
But the Southerners took no chances. They feared the possibility that an all-out
stand against any measure might lose and produce a stiff bill. They refrained
from any serious filibuster in exchange for the jury trial amendment and confining Title III to voting cases. 8
The Act also created the Civil Rights Commission to provide an analysis
of voting and other forms of discrimination.
Thus, the initial pattern was set for the Government to limit its affirmative
power to the field of voting rights. For most northern blacks, employment was
32 Adopted in 1949, rescinded in 1951, and reinstated in modified form in 1965, the rule
permits calling up on the House floor a bill pending before the Rules Committee for 21 calendar
days.
33 1 CONGRESS AND THE NATiON, supra note 28, at 1616.
34 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 1 CONGRESS AND THE NATION, supra note 28, at 1206-07.
36 Id. at 1621.
37 Id. at 1622-23.
38 16 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 187 (1958; 4ee Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634
(1957).
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the pressing issue. But resistance to that was not regional. And sadly, it was, and
still is, not as unassailable a proposition that all should have an equal chance to
work as that every citizen should vote.
Even in respect to voting, however, the inadequacy of piecemeal approaches
through case-by-case litigation soon became apparent. The Civil Rights Act of
1960 primarily involved a struggle over what step Congress would take next to
remedy massive denial of the franchise. In a landmark study during 1959, the
Civil Rights Commission called for federal voting registrars in areas with poor
records of black voting.
The proposal for systematic use of federal registrars was rejected. The
compromise enacted posed a series of three separate hearings before blacks could
vote. First, the Attorney General had to win a voting discrimination suit. Then
a separate hearing would be sought for a ruling that there was a pattern or
practice of such denials in the jurisdiction. Finally, a black would have to convince a court-appointed referee that he had been improperly refused registration
subsequent to the court's "pattern or practice" finding. 9
Needless to say, the time, man-hours and perseverance needed to run this
gauntlet did not swell the voting rolls. But the Government was inching towards
the kind of systematic approach which would finally succeed. Moreover, the
1960 Act required localities to retain their voting records (a requisite for justifying tighter legislation in the future) and it added anti-bombing provisions to the
federal criminal law."0
The Southerners defeated proposals in both Houses to add provisions on
employment and school desegregation. For different reasons, both the bipartisan
leadership in Congress and the Eisenhower Administration also sought to limit
the bill's focus to voting protection. The efforts at a stronger bill had little
chance, and a liberal cloture attempt, opposed by the Senate leadership as premature, failed even to muster a majority vote. The overwhelming consensus for
a narrow bill was explained partly by the fact that neither party wanted to alienate the South in a presidential election year. But it showed, too, the lack of substantial support for a strong civil rights package.41
The 1960 Act also extended the life of the Civil Rights Commission for
two years. This pattern of temporary reprieves for the Commission has continued
up to today-itself a sad reflection upon our commitment to attack the problems
of discrimination.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, we should not underestimate the
symbolic importance of the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. They were the
first civil rights laws of this century and formed the beachhead for the enactments
in the next decade. And, procedurally, they introduced the practice of preventing
civil rights bills from being bottled up in committee, either by keeping them from
the Judiciary Committee altogether, or by referring them there only for a time
certain.

39
40

41

16 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 38, at 191-95.
Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960).
16 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC, supra note 38, 196-97 (1961).
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B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
In 1964 Congress passed the most comprehensive civil rights measure since
Reconstruction and established a national commitment in all areas of racial discrimination. 42 Together with the Voting Rights Act the following year, its
passage was the recent highwater mark of the forces seeking federal action.
What made it possible?
I have mentioned the inadequacies in the 1957 and 1960 voter protection
laws and their deferral of action in other areas. More important was the brave
assertion by southern blacks of their birthright to equality. Civil rights initiatives
did not have priority in the first years of the Kennedy Administration.,
But events often overtake political timetables. Sit-ins, which had begun in
a small trickle during the late 1950's, swelled to massive demonstrations under
the uniquely charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King. The issue of civil
rights was dramatized in the most elemental terms as hoses and snarling dogs
faced courageous citizens seeking access to public facilities. Civil rights were
forced to the forefront of our consciousness, and became the most pressing issue
on Capitol Hill.43
With unprecedented pressure for action, both proponents and opponents of
the new measure faced strategic judgments on how far to press their positions.
How much might proponents seek and still hold public support for the bill?
Would their opponents accept some progress--as they had in 1957-to avert
complete defeat of a filibuster?
The tragedies in Birmingham, the assassination of Medgar Evers, and continued confrontations throughout the South underlined the need for a major
response. In the Senate, the prospect of a public accommodations law and
restrictions on federal aid programs were too much for the Southerners to accept
without a filibuster. Unlike Lyndon Johnson, who had kept the Senate in roundthe-clock sessions during the 1960 battle, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield kept
the Senate going at a less grueling but steady pace which lasted for more than
three months. But, in fact, dramatic all-night sessions in 1960 had produced
little more than frayed tempers and stubbed toes as Senators stumbled blearyeyed from their cots to answer quorum calls. And in 1964, the bill's proponents
were willing to engage in some debate-rather than make the Southerners hold
the floor-in order to expose the Southerners' positions and, hopefully, build the
support among their uncommitted colleagues and the public necessary for
4
cloture.
As had the jury trial amendment in the 1957 bill, once again a relatively
minor issue dominated the headlines: Mrs. Murphy's boardinghouse achieved
instant notoriety in the struggle to delineate the public accommodations title.
But there were other strong bases of opposition to the Act, even in the North
where concern centered on the equal employment legislation and the bill's im42
43

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
D.

ALMANAC

44

MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION,

338-82 (1965).

20 CONG.

QUARTERLY ALMANAC,

ch. 14 (1966); 20

suprax note 43, at 338-82.
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plication for de facto school segregation, which was then stirring controversy in

several major cities.
The symbolic heart of the bill was the public accommodation section.
Initially, the Republican leadership in the Senate would support only a voluntary
conciliation provision. Gradually, public support, private pressure and persuasion
produced a bipartisan coalition sufficient to get cloture. But that road was paved
with weeks of painstaking negotiations among the Senate liberals, the Justice
Department and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen who extracted several major
compromises.
As passed, the 1964 Act barred discriminatory literacy tests for voting
registration and discrimination in public accommodations. The Attorney General was authorized to sue to desegregate public facilities, including schools, if
the complainants were unable to or feared reprisal. He also was authorized to
intervene in any civil rights case of "public importance" brought under the
fourteenth amendment. Title VI, which I will examine later, enacted the longsought ban on federal funding of segregated programs. Title VII provided the
first federal fair employment law, barring discriminatory practices by employers,
unions or employment agencies.
Cloture did not come cheaply. Federal enforcement power in regard to
public accommodations and equal employment was deleted. Initial reliance on
conciliation by state agencies was required and, except for a limited power of the
Justice Department to bring "pattern or practice suits," enforcement of these
two tities was left to private litigation.
Another important deletion, with consequences only now becoming fully
clear, was the proposal to aid voluntary elimination of racial separation in the
school systems not found guilty of illegal segregation. Instead, Congress expressly
emphasized that nothing in the Act authorized courts or administrative officials
to require student transportation to achieve racial balance.45
Still in all, a combination of circumstances not likely to be repeated in the
near future had produced a far-reaching bill-and the first successful cloture of
a civil rights filibuster:
-Action to relieve the tension of confrontation in Montgomery and
elsewhere had become the number-one national issue.
-The media focused attention almost daily on both the demonstrations
and the debate of the bill.
-A nationwide coalition of religious groups, civil rights organizations
and labor unions conducted an unprecedented campaign to win grassroots support; the conspicuous role of leading clergy in particular
focused the issue in moral terms for many Americans.
-Because

of the urgency which all these developments imparted to

members of Congress, the bill's proponents worked out an elaborate
45

Id.
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system of marshalling information, updating strategy and coordinating
tactics with the Johnson Administration. In the Senate, for example,
the bill was divided by title among bipartisan teams of captains responsible for debating and negotiating the provisions of their part. And
the enormous resources of the Justice Department were invaluable."6
C. The 1965 Voting Rights Act
The following year, with large sympathetic majorities returned to Congress,
a sustained effort was made to pass the strong voting rights provisions deferred
from the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Following on their 1959 recommendations, the Civil Rights Commission
had by 1963 compiled a second, and even more thorough, study of voting discrimination. It documented numerous instances of violence and intimidation
and exposed the discriminatory application of literacy tests and other devices. I
had noted one example of these blatant practices during the 1964 debates.
Here is the illustration I described:
As recently as April 1963, in a voting case in Walthall County,
Mississippi, the Department of Justice was attempting to register a young
lady who was a Woodrow Wilson fellow in political science at Radcliffe
College of Harvard University. The Harvard graduate had "failed" the
voter registration test-she was a Negro. The Government in this case called
seven white witnesses who had applied to register. They were illiterate.
They were white. They had passed the same voter registration test.
The measure proposed by President Johnson was unprecedented in scope
and uncompromising in its operation. Thanks to the Civil Rights Commission,
it was based on an equally unprecedented and uncompromising record of the
need for such drastic measures.
In the eight years of litigation by the Justice Department, no substantial
progress had been made, despite strenuous efforts and devotion of considerable
government resources. The Commission had found that in one hundred particularly troublesome counties in eight southern states, about five percent of the
voting age blacks were registered in 1956 before any federal legislation. By 1962,
the best estimate was that the figure had only increased to 8.3 percent. As I indicated then, at that pace it would have taken over a century to get even a
majority of the blacks in those counties registered.
Government's lawsuits were ineffective for several reasons. The Department's limited resources were divided among many suits throughout the South.
It often took hundreds of man-hours to establish a discriminatory pattern. Even
then, the Department had the difficult burden of proving the discriminatory
intent, often confronted by a hostile white judge and jury.
Nor did piercing this maze necessarily ensure local blacks the vote---even
when individual suits were successful. For by the time a court order enjoined
46
47

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19 7 3 -1973p (1970).
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one procedure, a new stratagem had been devised and implemented. Often, too,
the election was over and the courts would not upset the result. For the Justice
Department, the situation was akin to that faced by those poor greyhounds at
the racetrack who can never quite catch the mechanical rabbit."
The counterstrategy devised was a complementary set of remedies. First,
there could be a ban on all literacy tests and similar devices, rather than a
challenge to their individual application.
Second, federal "examiners" could be sent to areas where local election
officials were clearly recalcitrant. The federal agents would be empowered
directly to certify eligible blacks for registration.
Third, to ensure registered blacks would be allowed to vote, federal observers
could also be sent on election day.
Most important, the burden of compliance was shifted from the Justice
Department to local jurisdictions. This was the so-called "preclearance" provision of section 5. No new local law which affected voting rights could be
implemented without submitting it to the Attorney General or a three-judge
district court in Washington for prior clearance. The burden of proof was
placed on the submitting jurisdiction to demonstrate the law was not discriminatory in either purpose or effect. Thus, the status quo was frozen until the
federal government had had a chance to review the new law.49
The remedies I have outlined automatically applied to any state or local
government in which registration of eligible residents, or voting by those registered, in the 1964 presidential election were less than 50 percent. But the same
remedies were also available in any other jurisdiction when a federal court found
a violation of the fifteenth amendment. 50
Like the 1964 Act, the Voting Rights Act was passed against a tragic
backdrop. In early 1965, the stepped-up efforts of civil rights workers to register
black voters focused on Selma, Alabama. In Selma, between 1962 and mid1964, only 93 of the 795 blacks who tried to register were enrolled; only 335 of
the city's 15,000 blacks had been permitted to vote. Increasingly violent confrontations culminated in naked brutality and three deaths. Once more the
nation was reminded of the grievous scars upon its conscience. 1
In the House, a weaker proposal was offered as a substitute for the
President's bill by several northern Congressmen. It was defeated when it was
embraced as a reasonable compromise by several southern speakers. Meanwhile,
the Senate had instructed its judiciary Committee to report a bill out on a day
certain and then proceeded to vote down a series of Southern floor amendments
by large majorities.2
The major floor fight in the Senate involved a proposed outright ban on
poll taxes for state elections. The compromise eventually adopted contained no
ban; but it included congressional findings that such taxes inhibited enjoyment
48 See S. Rep. No. 162, Pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-09, 314

(1966).
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of fourteenth amendment rights and directed the Attorney General "forthwith"
to bring a test case directly under the amendment. The Senate then voted
cloture, for only the second time in history on a civil rights measure. In conference, the House poll tax ban was dropped and the Act became a law.5"
The Act's impact was immediate. In some counties, the Justice Department obtained voluntary compliance. Federal examiners were appointed in only
32 southern counties in the first year but the total black registration in the five
states with the worst records increased 40 percent in the first half year.5 4
In less measurable ways, the 1964 Act could boast of similarly spectacular
successes. With a few notable exceptions, most public facilities and private
establishments subject to the public accommodations provisions had been peacefully desegregated. As we shall see later, the administrative compliance provisions of Title VI began to take hold with regard to school desegregation and
major litigation was begun under the Equal Employment provisions of Title VII.
D. The 1968 Fair Housing Act
The unfinished agenda was still a long one, as it included black jury service,
fair housing, enforcement power for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and protection for civil rights workers. But the following year served
notice that the heady pace of 1964 and 1965 was not inexorable.
In 1966 President Johnson sent Congress another omnibus bill calling for
civil rights worker protection, federal jury access, Justice Department authority
for suits to enjoin any civil rights deprivations, and a ban on private discrimination in housing.
In the context of a changing national mood on civil rights, opposition to
the fair housing provision splintered the Senate coalition which had triumphed
in the two previous sessions. Minority Leader Dirksen, who had been crucial to
obtaining cloture in 1964 and 1965, rejected anything but voluntary compliance
programs. Although the Senate Judiciary Committee was successfully bypassed,
a House-passed measure with a modified version of the President's housing bill
was filibustered to death.55
Beyond opposition to the housing measure, 1966 saw the general public
interest in further civil rights legislation ease perceptibly. Racial demonstrations
in northern cities from Watts to Chicago and New York had produced violence
viewed differently than the brutality in Selma and Montgomery. Whites were
uneasy about a new black militancy symbolized by the "black power" slogan.
The civil rights coalition itself was fissured. Some argued that black demands
had become too diffuse for effective mobilization of political effort.
Others, perhaps more realistically, noted the specific black concerns which
challenged northern school segregation, slum conditions and unemployment.
These observers suggested that the calls for further legislation simply were getting
too close to home for northern supporters of the 1964 and 1965 Acts.56
53
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At the start of 1967, the prospects for significant legislation were bleak. I
reintroduced the administration's omnibus measure-this time with added
enforcement powers for the EEOC and for the fair housing program. At the
same time, the measure was split up and other Senators introduced each title
separately in the hope of gaining hearings, and perhaps more, for at least one or
two elements.
The southern counterstrategy was twofold: keep the other provision tied
to the fair housing controversy, and keep the main spotlight on the renewed
outbreak of riots in the summer of 1967.
Unperturbed by our grand strategy, Senator Ervin had his Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights hold hearings on my omnibus bill, and he also highlighted the recent violence.5"
The issue seemed to be, as John Hannah observed, whether any measure
would be withheld for fear it would seem to reward rioters, or whether we
would realize the pent-up frustrations involved and pass some measure to
"redeem a long overdue pledge to 20 million Americans."- 8
The House, having seen a hard-fought housing measure die in the Senate
in 1966, passed a limited worker protection act and sent it to us at the end of
1967. As a good example of how omniscient politicians are, the majority leader,
administration strategists and I were all convinced we would be lucky to pass
even that in the Senate; a fair housing measure seemed out of the question and
would doom the worker protection bill. In fact, liberals on the Judiciary Committee found themselves in the embarrassing position of voting to defeat a fair
housing amendment to the House bill, which Chairman Eastland helpfully
offered, he admitted, "as a little dose of medicine which will be fatal." 9
However, to my pleasant surprise, within six months we had not only the
worker protection provisions but a comprehensive federal fair housing law as
60

well.

On the eve of adjournment in December, 1967, Senator Mansfield, an
unsung hero of the Housing Act story, quietly made the House bill the pending
business for Congress' return in January. At the start of the new Congress, the
civil rights bloc reviewed the bidding and decided to chance a fair housing floor
amendment. Senator Mansfield, still dubious about the prospects, left the bill
up for six weeks of debate and four attempts at cloture-resisting numerous
pressures to proceed to other business-while a compromise was hammered out
with Senator Dirksen and cloture votes were slowly picked up.
As in the Title VII compromise of 1964, federal enforcement power was
limited to pattern or practice suits by the Department of Justice. Various exemptions also were made for owner-occupied homes-Mrs. Murphy revisitedand for private individuals selling up to three houses without a broker.61 The
Act, however, does prohibit refusals to rent or sell, and the use of discriminatory
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terms, advertising or mortgage lending. It also bans blockbusting. Apart from
conciliation by state agencies or HUD, enforcement is by private lawsuit.
What explains Congress' ability to pass the Housing Act in 1968 after the
effort was rebuffed two years earlier? Some would point to external events,
such as the 1967 riots in several Northern cities, particularly Detroit and Newark,
or the ensuing Kerner Commission Report whose preliminary conclusions on the
growing racial division became public shortly before the successful Senate cloture
vote. Some have suggested the assassination of Martin Luther King, shortly
before the key House maneuvers to avoid sending the bill to conference, was a
factor. However, I believe that tragedy came too late in the process to have
much impact.
Perhaps some members of Congress hoped passage would affect the Supreme
Court's decision in the then-pending case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 2
which involved the potentially greater reach of the 1866 Civil Rights Enforcement Act. Notwithstanding passage of the 1968 law, however, the Court held
the earlier statute barred all racial discrimination, public or private, in the sale
or rental of realty.
One might look instead to the unswerving commitment and extraordinarily
effective efforts of Mr. Clarence Mitchell, both personally, and in coordinating
the forces of the Civil Rights Leadership Conference.
And some might simply say that the nation needed a breathing space after
the 1964-1965 period before passage of another major civil rights bill opens
up new areas to federal intervention.
The final verdict can be left to the historians. 3 The important point was
that the last major sphere of daily activity-the effort to find housing of one's
choice-had been brought under the scrutiny of federal law.
The worker protection portion of the Act met a statutory construction
problem which the Supreme Court had raised with the original criminal civil
rights laws. In Screws v. United States,64 the Court held that to avoid vagueness
defects, the 1870 Enforcement Act had to be read as requiring specific intent to
interfere with the victim's constitutional rights. The 1968 Act spells out the
specific areas of interference with Negroes exercising their civil rights or with
those assisting that exercise. The Act says if you intend, for example, to intimidate someone because he seeks open housing, you have committed the offense,
whether or not you advert to the fact that this is interference with his "civil
rights." The requirement that force or the threat of force be used was retained."'
In 1968 Congress also passed separately a bill to ensure fairly drawn jury
panels in the federal courts.6"
E. The End of the Decade-Where We Stood
In retrospect, enactment of these major civil rights laws was extremely
significant from several perspectives.
62
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First, it laid to rest substantial doubt about the constitutionality of sweeping
legislation to enforce civil rights or curtail the impact of discrimination on the
free flow of commerce. In Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States6 the
Supreme Court found congressional power to ban discrimination in public accommodations because of its disruptive effect on interstate commerce and to
reach local incidents which have a harmful impact upon that commerce. Upholding the Voting Rights Act in Katzenbach v. Morgan," the Court found it
unnecessary to decide whether state laws prohibited by the Act directly contravened the fourteenth amendment. The Court said Congress has broad
authority under section 5 of the amendment to implement it with power parallel
to the authority bestowed by the "Necessary and Proper" clause of article I.
Besides section 5 and the commerce clause, there seem few roads Congress
might take to implement the fourteenth amendment's guarantees or remove the
impact of discrimination upon our economy which would be held to be beyond
its constitutional reach.
Second, these measures gave the lie to an old adage, often heard in the halls
of Congress, that we cannot change people's attitudes by new laws, that the
order must be reversed, that we cannot legislate brotherhood. Consider the
compliance with the public accommodations and public facilities titles of the
1964 Act-not to mention school desegregation in many southern communities
under Title VI plans. Or recall that in some southern communities local Negro
officials are accepted for the first time in history. I believe these developments
make clear that new laws can create new situations in which perceptions of reality are sharpened and one's attitudes do change.
True, laws only govern our external behavior. But, by creating new situations of experience and controlling permissible actions, they have an eventual
effect upon a person's thoughts as well. As Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall once
put it: "Laws not only provide concrete benefits; they can even change the
'69
hearts of men-some men, anyway, for good or evil."
Passage of these laws demonstrated, too, that the Senate filibuster was not
a permanent roadblock to civil rights legislation if the time was ripe.
But what were the right conditions for effective action? The 1960's taught
us what a kaleidescopic pattern of circumstances might be needed: historic,
sometimes tragic events; forceful personalities; broad coalitions of dedicated
private groups. Each of these elements seemed necessary to convince a majority
of Americans to help achieve equality for a minority-even though that achievement would serve the interest of all.
We saw the critical importance of executive leadership, too. For the
President does indeed speak from the "Bully Pulpit," as Teddy Roosevelt called
it. Without the President's energetic support, forward movement may be extremely difficult. The majesty of the White House and the direct voice to the
people it provides can be an incalculable force for good or ill.
But most important, this period witnessed substantial involvement of
67 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
68 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
69 Address by Solicitor General Marshall, White House Conference "To Fulfill These
Rights," June 1, 1966.
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Congress in the struggle for civil rights beyond the limited sphere of voting.
Thus the foundation was laid for all three branches of Government to share the
awesome responsibilities of fullfilling the promise of equality. Regrettably, the
opportunity to follow up this initial commitment with further legislative attacks
on the complex problems of discrimination were not utilized by Congress or the
Executive. As a result, the end of the decade saw the judiciary once more become
the lightning rod for difficulties reaped from a century of neglect.
IV. The First Years of the Seventies
By the end of the decade, the importance of follow-up efforts by the
Congress was clear. The progress made under Voting Rights Act and Title VI
termination provisions of the 1964 Act had produced a sharp reaction against
each. The Equal Employment provision had proven inadequate without greater
power for the EEOC.
A. Extending the Voting Rights Act
By 1969, the 1965 Act was hailed as the most successful civil rights law
ever passed. In eight years of litigation from 1957 to 1965, the Justice Department had been able to help only 46,000 blacks register in the South. In the first
four years under the Act, 800,000 blacks registered. In the single state of
Mississippi, registration jumped from seven percent to 60 percent. Over 300
black-elected officials won posts throughout the South.7
Despite these gains, much remained to be done. Black registration was still
glaringly less than that of whites in most of the Deep South-in many counties
less than half. There was still widespread intimidation. Moreover, the progress
which had been made came under intense counterattack. Many communities
began to shift their emphasis from denying the ballot to diluting the impact of
votes through a variety of election laws and laws affecting the local political
structure. There were many ingenious ways to eliminate or diminish the potential
impact of the new Negro vote:
-gerrymandering reapportionments
-annexing predominately white communities
-making elective posts appointive
-- switching from district to at-large elections
-and other more complex devices to prevent the impact of a cohesive
Negro vote. All these were used. Congress had been aware that new techniques
might be attempted in this fashion. That is why the key innovation of the Act,
section 5, froze the status quo until changes in election laws passed federal
71
scrutiny.
While the initial focus of the Act's operation had been on registering voters,
implementing section 5 in the first few years was less a matter of clearing pro70 Joint Views of the Senate judiciary Committee on H.R. 4249 to Extend the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 116 CONG. REc. 5517-29 (1970). This statement by a majority of the
Committee was treated as the committee report inasmuch as the Judiciary Committee did not
convene to vote on the measure. See 116 CONG. REc. 5529 (1970). (Remarks of Sen. Scott.)
71 Id.
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posals than getting them submitted in the first place. Many states and towns
either chose to ignore it completely, or maintained a proposed change was not
within its purview. In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had sought
a broad remedial power in section 5.72 The Court emphasized that section 5
aimed at the subtle, as well as the crude, impediments to meaningful political
participation. The Court observed, "The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."7
This was the setting when the Voting Rights Act came up for extension in
the 90th Congress, and the crucial importance of the "trigger provisions" of
section 5 formed the focus of the debate.74
In 1965, President Johnson's original proposal was for the Act to stay in
full force ten years. In Congress that was shortened, with no recorded explanation, to five years. While the Act would remain on the books, southern states
which had used voting tests discriminatorily until 1965 would have been able
to get out from under the trigger provision and automatic coverage of section 5
in late 1970.
Under the Act, a state subject to the automatic triggering formula could
remove itself from that, coverage by proving in court that, although it had low
registration levels, there had been no discriminatory use of literacy tests or similar
devices for at least five years. In 1965 the Act itself had suspended any use of
such tests at all in those states, so they would automatically have been able to
make such a showing in 1970 and come out from under the coverage of section
5.75 Civil rights groups simply urged an extension of the entire Act for the second
five-year period. 6
Attorney General John Mitchell proposed substantial revisions of the Act.
He claimed section 5 was unworkable and no longer needed, and suggested
going back to a case-by-case approach, under which the Attorney General could
seek examiners or enjoin voting laws only after winning a court suit. He also
suggested a nationwide ban on literacy tests and a limit on residency requirements
77
imposed for federal elections.
The civil rights groups uniformly opposed this purported expansion of the
Act as a thinly disguised emasculation. They noted the plan was, at best, no more
than reversion to the very case-by-case approach the inadequacy of which had
led to passage of the Act. Once again the Attorney General would have to find
out about new voting laws as best he could, divide his resources among a welter
of suits, let the new procedures take effect until he won in court, and carry the
burden of proof. This was little more than existing law, already available under
the Voting Rights Act for those areas not under the trigger provisions. 8
Another timely survey by the Civil Rights Commission provided vital ammunition. Political Participation, published in 1968, amply documented the
72 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
73 Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
74 See Hearings on H.R. 4249 Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings] and Hearings on H.R. 4249 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
75 Joint Views, supra note 70.
76 Senate Hearings, supra note 74, at 90, 272, and 313 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell).
77 Id. at 182, 220 (testimony of Attorney General Mitchell).
78 Joint Views, supra note 70.
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continued need for section 5. Testifying to the House Committee on the
Judiciary for the Commission, Father Hesburgh warned its elimination would
"turn back the clock to 1957."' 1
The House of Representatives passed the administration proposal as a lastminute floor substitute for the simple extension which the Judiciary Committee
had reported. In the Senate, members supporting section 5 offered a compromise: An extension of the 1965 law intact, plus the separate addition of a
nationwide literacy test ban and restriction of residency requirements. But it was
uncertain whether cloture for any bill could be obtained without White House
aid, and the President's position was unclear.8"
There was, however, a fortuitous, and ironic, development. The nomination
of Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court had been reported by the Judiciary
Committee and was waiting in the wings. Judge Carswell's supporters apparently
felt time was working against the nomination and sought to avert a prolonged
filibuster over the Voting Rights Act. They had sought permission to have the
Carswell nomination considered before the Voting Rights Act extension was
taken up. But the Majority Leader insisted the Voting Rights Act be disposed
of first. That made possible the civil rights group's strategy of holding the
Carswell nomination hostage to any filibuster on the Voting Rights Act.8' It
is difficult to tell whether the Southerners' strategy was based on their judgment
that in the end cloture would have come or their concern for the Carswell nomination, but in any event, they did not filibuster.
The compromise prevailed in the Senate and was accepted without conference in the House. The Act would continue in full force with no new laws
implemented until federal review. 2
B. Oversight of Section 5 Enforcement

But Congress soon found that the Justice Department was trying to accomplish through administrative policy what it had lost on the legislative battlefield. The incident repays some study as an example of a seemingly narrow
procedural wrangle which can jeopardize a major statute and require close
congressional oversight.
As I have indicated, the usefulness of section 5, to a great extent, turns on
the state or county having the burden of proof to show a proposed new law is
not discriminatory. If the Attorney General enters an objection during the 60day waiting period which follows its submission, the law may not be implemented. The Act's supporters assumed this was amply clear from the language
and from the legislative history. Repeatedly during passage of the Act in 1965
and its extension in 1970, both its proponents and its most vigorous opponents
acknowledged that the burden of persuasion would be on the submitting jurisdiction.
In November, 1970, Mississippi submitted a statewide reapportionment
79
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plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General indicated
he would not object, despite his finding some evidence of discriminatory purpose, because he could not make up his mind one way or the other and the 60
days had run. In effect, this response told Mississippi that the Attorney General
would shoulder the burden of proof-contrary to the legislative intent-and
would not object unless he affirmatively found discrimination."
The national civil rights community was alarmed at the implications of this
interpretation. Concern that the Mississippi ruling might prove a precedent was
well founded. Congress learned of impending regulations to implement the
Act. Numerous procedural questions had arisen, and it made sense to prescribe
some procedures for handling them. But the regulations initially proposed also
would have stated that the Attorney General would object only if he could make
a finding of discrimination. The issue was not minor. The danger posed was
a hole through which one could drive a truck.
For any submission, there were three possible outcomes. A finding of discriminatory purpose or effect would produce an objection. A finding that there
was no discrimination would preclude an objection. Everyone agreed on those
two positions. But what of the middle case, where the Attorney General had insufficient information to make a firm finding one way or the other? Would he
object or wouldn't he? In such situations, it would be easy for an Attorney
General to throw up his hands and say, in effect: "Well, this is all very difficult, and see my time has run out, but I can't reach a conclusion whether it's
discriminatory or not. So I won't object." Any jurisdiction could submit a
complex change with scanty data on its genesis or impact, create an ambiguous
situation and, if the Department was inclined to be sympathetic, obtain clearance
because the issue had not been resolved and the review period had run.
Consultation between the Justice Department and interested members of
Congress left no doubt of the opposed positions. A bipartisan group of Senators
and Congressmen conveyed their concern. They were joined by a large number
of private civil rights, labor and religious organizations, professors from numerous
law schools and several of the nation's leading private attorneys. All urged the
Attorney General to reconsider.84
Eventually, the Administration did review its position, and the guidelines
were issued with the desired statement. Of course, the Justice Department might
still approve a questionable submission: the umpire might agree that the rules
of the game permitted three strikes and four balls; but he could still cry, "Ball
Four," as the batter swung furiously at a full-count pitch, and missed. Nevertheless, it will be far harder to do this if there must be an articulated finding of no
discrimination.
C. Amending the Equal Employment Opportunity Law
In contrast to the substantial success of the Voting Rights Act, experience
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the
83 HUNTER, THE TRAGic
84 Id.
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1964 Civil Rights Act underlined the high cost of the compromises which had
been thought necessary to obtain cloture with that title in the bill.
In 1964, the House had approved a Commission with power to bring suit
against discriminating employers. The Senate Committee bill had been even
stronger, providing so-called "cease and desist" power under which the Commission, like other regulatory agencies, could issue its own enforceable orders.85
Indeed, a fair employment agency with teeth had been the single main legislative
goal of the civil rights coalition since 1944. But in 1964, it was still clear that
insistence upon federal enforcement power would jeopardize even provision of
a private right of action.
The Commission was given the power to investigate complaints and determine "probable cause" to believe there had been a violation. But it was
limited to negotiating voluntary compliance. Except for pattern and practice
litigation by the Attorney General, enforcement was limited to private lawsuits
under the Act.86
Moreover, given the general tenor of debate over the 1964 Act, the focus
was on blatant acts of discrimination in employment. Once documented, explicit
exclusionary policies or actions by identifiable individuals in a company could
be brought to management's attention and, it was hoped, handled to a large
extent through conciliation. In areas where overt management resistance was
expected, it seemed possible that private litigation could be effective, particularly
since attorneys' fees were provided where appropriate."
A second major defect was the large loophole left when employment discrimination by state and local government agencies was expressly excluded from
Title VII coverage. Nor could such discrimination be reached through federal
fund termination under Title VI of the 1964 Act. Employment discrimination
generally, with minor exceptions, had been exempted from Title VI. Thus,
despite the furor about Government interference with private activity, it was
employment discrimination by government itself which fell between the two provisions and was left untouched.88
This exemption was defended on the ground that the fourteenth amendment already permitted suits against official discrimination. However, there was
little reason to expect more substantial impact from individual lawsuits against
local government without support from a federal agency in this area than had
been made by litigation in the voting rights area even with Justice Department
assistance.
In its 1969 report, For All the People . . . By All the People, the Civil
Rights Commission had detailed discrimination in government employment
through the nation:
The basic finding of this study is that State and local governments have
failed to fulfill their obligation to assure equal job opportunity. In many
localities, minority group members are denied equal access to responsible
85 Developments, Title VII, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1196-97 (1971).
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government jobs... and often are excluded from employment except in the
most menial capacities.8 9

At the same time, several presidential commissions noted the distrust and
hostility toward government caused by the small numbers of blacks in agencies
dealing with local communities in such vital services as welfare, the police, and,
in the case of rural areas, the county agricultural agents.9"
The need for putting some teeth in the EEOC was even clearer. The impetus for EEOC enforcement power increased as the focus of attacks on employment discrimination shifted away from the more obvious barriers of segregated pay scales and departments, explicit refusals to hire or union exclusion
policies.
Instances of such blatant discrimination expressly directed at particular
individuals or groups remain,-but they no longer constituted the most typical or
significant target for an effective campaign to assure equal opportunity. Attention shifted to the more fundamental problem of institutionalized discrimination
which results when the effect of past segregation is perpetuated through seniority
and recruitment policies, or from the use of job testing and other practices of
questionable business necessity.9 ' Exclusion of black applicants, or bias against
their advancement that is systematically embedded in personnel policies or plant
organization, of course, is hardly less devastating to the individuals affected than
cruder forms. And in terms of the number of workers affected, its impact is far
more serious.
In the years following the passage of the 1964 Act, the civil rights forces
sought repeatedly to remedy these two defects and finally met with partial success eight years later in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which
amended Title VII to provide coverage of public employees and limited enforcement power for the Commission.92 That battle is also instructive.

In 1970, a renewed campaign was mounted to grant the Commission power
to issue cease and desist orders after a full hearing. The arguments for cease and
desist seemed impressive. Thirty-four of the 38 states with equal employment agencies had provided such authority; Congress had given cease and
desist power to the other federal regulatory agencies; and its effectiveness in
93
promoting uniformity and development expertise was clear.
This last point was particularly important in view of the increasingly
intricate cases before the EEOC and its mounting backlog. The advantage in

such situations of accumulated expertise for both the advocate and the tribunal
is the essential rationale for committing adjudication to any administrative
agency. Agency expertise, combined with the power to issue enforcement orders,
also is critical to reducing backlogs with limited resources. Together they are
likely to produce a much higher rate of negotiated compliance than the mere
89 COIMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE... By ALL THE PEOPLE 131 (1969).
90 See, e.g., NAT'L ADVISORY CoMM'N ON CIVIL DisORDERS, supra note 6, at 165.
91 Note, Racially Neutral Criteria and Discrimination Under Title VII, 6 Mcic. J. oF L.
REFORM 97 (1972) ; Developments, Title VII, supra note 85, at 1113-65.
92 42 U.S.C. A. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1973 Supp.).
93 S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 18, at 17-19.
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threat of a regular lawsuit before judges having limited familiarity with the
field.94
Nevertheless, there was still substantial opposition throughout the country to
cease and desist power for the Commission. The traditional fate of tough fair
employment legislation reflected the difficulties it had always encountered, even
while northern public opinion pressed for an end to segregation in the South.
By 1970, the new administration's restraints on the economy had produced
a recession. Unemployment was the main concern of many white workers. This,
plus the publicity received by the initial efforts to implement affirmative action
programs such as the "Philadelphia Plan," made white workers uneasy about the
impact which enforcement powers for the EEOC would have on their own
job security. Nor were businessmen throughout the country anxious to face an
EEOC with teeth.
Among the opponents of cease and desist in Congress, those who were
willing to provide any enforcement mechanism at all for Title VII offered a
compromise "court enforcement procedure," under which the EEOC could sue
in a district court, like any other litigant, but not issue its own orders.
Their main argument, that cease and desist power denied due process by
letting a single agency act as "prosecutor, judge and jury," had long been raised
against other agencies. Proponents of cease and desist countered with assurance
that there would be the separation of function required by the Administrative
Procedures Act and a statutorily independent General Counsel as in the NLRB.95
Nevertheless, the "court-enforcement" substitute procedure prevailed. After
three years of intense maneuvering, the issue was finally resolved in 1972. In
the House of Representatives, a committee cease and desist bill was replaced on
the floor by the court-enforcement proposal. In the Senate, a substantial majority
demonstrated support for cease and desist power on three separate occasions, but
in a struggle worthy of Sisyphus they were defeated by the still-potent power of
the filibuster.
The Senate had passed a bill providing cease and desist power in 1970
which died in the House. In 1972, the same bill was promptly reported. On
the floor, a court-enforcement substitute was defeated and, after a few days of
the Byzantine parliamentary confusion at which the Senate excels, the substitute
was again defeated. So far so good, but it proved not quite good enough. Cloture failed twice, and after a month's debate it was clear that the cease and
desist approach did not have the two-thirds support necessary for cloture. Finally,
a variant of the court-enforcement approach was accepted and the House then
concurred."
A major factor in the intensity of opposition to cease and desist power was
that the courts had begun to construe Congress' intent that Title VII reach business and union practices with a discriminatory effect, and not merely those where
a discriminatory purpose could be proven. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,9"
decided in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that any employment or promotion
94 Id.
95 Id. See 28 CONG. QUARTERLY
96 Id. at 247-56.
97 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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test which perpetuated past segregation had to be job-related to survive scrutiny
under Title VII, even absent a showing of discriminatory intent by the employer.
The unanimous Court explained:
We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals
erred in examining the employer's intent; but good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as "built-in head winds" for minority groups and
are unrelated to measure job capacity. 98
Similarly, an increasing number of lower courts have held that Title VII
requires fair job recruitment efforts to ensure equal opportunity where a company's former segregation makes neutral recruitment discriminatory. For example, a past "Whites only" policy would make word-of-mouth recruitment
palpably discriminatory in its impact on potential black employees or union
members. In such situations, courts have remedial power to order recruitment
efforts to overcome that "built-in head winds" from the past.99
If a sufficient body of case law continues to develop with regard to practices
that have a discriminatory effect, the EEOC may be able to encourage substantial numbers of negotiated remedies even without the cease and desist power.
When we compare the successful preservation of the Voting Rights Act
with the failure to add cease and desist power for the EEOC, what considerations account for the different results? For one thing, geography. The Voting
Rights Act is a nationwide law. But the dissatisfaction with its growing impact
was confined to the South."' The prospect of cease and desist authority, on the
other hand, aroused elements of the business community throughout the nation.
It was time for Northerners to reexamine the South's charge that there was a
double standard in the reception given civil rights proposals. Second, the proposed change in the Voting Rights Act-whatever the technicalities-could be
explained simply and accurately as an effort to weaken a successful law and
thereby risk considerable progress. In the EEOC struggle, it was necessary to
build public support for an additional measure which opponents charged would
have dire unforeseen results.
Both situations reflected the repercussions as civil rights enforcement began
to move beyond examples of naked motive, and began removing the burdens
of discriminatory effects, where purpose was unclear or the immediate racial
impact was unintentional. But denial of the vote carries a special stigma-it
is hard to rationalize on any basis, whatever one's perception of the minority's
problems in jobs, housing or education.
Finally, the EEOC fight came two years after the Voting Rights Act renewal, and during that period concern increased substantially about the backlash over school desegregation court decisions and their impact under Title VI
of the 1964 Act. The national mood on civil rights had changed again.
98 Id. at 432.
99 Note, Racially Neutral Criteria and Discrimination Under Title VII, supra note 91, at
121-25.
100 For states under the "trigger formula" (essentially the "Deep South"), the stringent
remedies applied automatically; elsewhere they are available only upon a judicial finding of
discrimination. See text supra at note 49.
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D. Title VI Enforcement in Education
The provision of Title VI for terminating federal aid applied to local programs of every kind. But the main focus of congressional oversight has been
the duty of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to insure that no
recipient school district used federal funds if it was not in compliance with the
school desegregation required by the Constitution. By the late 1960's, this compliance program prompted intensive review in Congress, not only by some who
sought more vigorous enforcement of the Act, but also by others who sought to
limit the power of the Secretary to require full desegregation as a condition of
federal funding.
The stakes involved under Title VI rose sharply one year after it took effect,
when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.101
Until then, federal spending on precollege education amounted to only a few
million dollars annually. In the 1965 Education Act, it jumped sharply to
several hundred million dollars. Now local school districts had a lot more to
lose. Indeed, had the Elementary and Secondary Education Act been on the
books in 1964, there would have been considerably stiffer opposition to enacting
Title VI at all.
Title VI prohibits discrimination under any program of activity receiving
federal financial assistance. The Act directs each agency administering a federal
program to ensure compliance. The legislative history of Title VI and its interpretation by the courts meant that the standard for compliance would be geared
to the fourteenth amendment obligation to desegregate as enunciated by the
Supreme Court. In 1964, that standard was still "deliberate speed" and few
districts were integrated. In fact, although a decade had passed since the Brown
decision, only 2% of the black children in the South were attending school with
any white pupils 0 2
Accordingly, HEW's initial efforts to implement Title VI did not press for
significant school desegregation in the short run. Instead, emphasis was placed
on obtaining from every segregated school district a formal commitment to the
process, known in the bureaucracy, with mixed feelings, as "paper compliance."
This was an important first step; it constituted a formal acknowledgment of
the obligation to desegregate and to submit a plan for working toward that goal.
It should be remembered that the years of "massive resistance" to any official
action were, in 1964, a very recent memory.
For many with high hopes for Title VI, the step was too small in light of
a ten-year-old precedent that segregated schools were clearly unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the establishment of this compliance system and the official recognition by district officials of their duty to comply laid the foundation for developing substantive guidelines and for gradually insisting upon greater and greater
progress toward full desegregation. Merely installing this systematic mechanism
for monitoring the desegregation process and working with districts to develop
feasible plans-always with the ultimate threat of financial sanction-had great
101
102
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advantage over the less coordinated court efforts to supervise desegregation in
each state.
The initial HEW guideline followed then operative Supreme Court precedent. It called for gradual implementation of free choice plans-four grades
per year-looking towards desegregation of all grade levels by the 1967-68
school year. In 1966, revised guidelines called for faculty integration and spelled
out the requirements of a meaningful freedom-of-choice approach." 3
In these years, the advantage of an administrative agency emerged as HEW
accumulated considerable expertise in evaluating the actual results of freedomof-choice plans. Building on this experience, the Supreme Court's 1968 decision
in Green u. County School Board of New Kent County.. held that the time
for "deliberate speed" had passed. The Court ruled that freedom-of-choice
plans would thereafter meet fourteenth amendment obligations only if they
worked realistically and promptly to desegregate schools as much as possible.
The Court also cast doubt upon the acceptability of such plans in many situations. HEW issued parallel guideline revisions indicating that plans acceptable
for Title VI purposes would have to go beyond freedom of choice in most cases.
The guideline called for full desegregation by the 1969-70 school term, two
years later, and for the first time, referred to northern school districts as well
as those in the South." 5 Termination proceedings were begun against the
Ferndale school district in my own state of Michigan.
Then, in July of 1969, the new administration announced a major shift
in its primary enforcement effort from HEW's Title VI compliance program
to reliance on Justice Department litigation. It claimed that Title VI sanction,
in contrast to a court order for desegregation, would only hurt affected children.
At the same time, the Justice Department sought a year's delay in the courts'
desegregation timetables."0 This new posture signalled encouragement to recalcitrants, undermined good faith efforts of other community leaders to comply,
and, generally, proved a self-fulfilling prophecy that Title VI would break down.
In fact, the overwhelming majority of southern school districts were then in
compliance, and the remainder largely were districts which received little federal fundng. In most instances, problems had never gone to termination because compliance was negotiated at an earlier stage. Even with the more
stringent standard imposed by the Green decision, revised plans had been
negotiated successfully. 0"
But when the administration signalled that HEW enforcement would subside and the Justice Department sought delay of several major desegregation
cases before courts, the situation changed: a third of the southern districts
which had submitted plans for substantial steps in the fall of 1969 reneged
on their commitments. 8 In accordance with the new policy under Title VI,
Despite this setback in Title
no termination proceedings were commenced.'
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VI, the momentum of school desegregation continued when the Supreme Court
rejected Justice Department requests for delays and ruled in Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education11 that the time had finally come for full
and immediate elimination of segregated schools. Fifteen years after Brown,
further denial of desegregated education was ruled constitutionally impermissible.
The new policy of putting HEW enforcement efforts on the back burner
had cooled the pressures from many members of Congress to curtail its activity.
But that policy also had accomplished a more fundamental and regrettable
development. It put the entire burden of political responsibility for school
desegregation back onto the federal courts, rather than having that responsibility
shared by the Executive Branch implementing a law of Congress. The virulent
controversy over transportation of students to desegregate schools was about to
burst on the national landscape. And with the courts left standing alone to take
the heat, this controversy produced an attack on the federal courts that paralleled
similar assaults on an isolated judiciary in the years immediately following the
Brown decision. A year later, the Title VI program came under increased
attack when the most recent major Supreme Court case on school desegregation,
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenbergBoard of Education"' held that student transportation was a valid desegregation tool: The Court's emphasis on the word
"reasonable""' 2 was soon lost in the ensuing furor. The Court had made clear
that fundamental interests of white or black children would not be sacrificed:
pupil age would be a principal consideration, and in any event, no transportation
would be permitted which endangered student safety, or impaired the educational process.
Nonetheless, as urban school systems in the South and North began to
face the possibility of student transportation for desegregation purposes, efforts
in Congress mounted to prevent either HEW or the courts from requiring such
steps. These restrictions, which we will examine later, were eventually enacted
in modified form. As the busing controversy became caught up in the swirl of
presidential politics, even more sweeping proposals to curtail desegregation
remedies were debated in Congress. The future of Title VI compliance in education was cloudy to say the least.
Whatever its prospects, Title VI had played a very significant role in the
tremendous progress made over six short years. Particularly in the period from
1964 to 1969 the systematic compliance approach had complemented judicial
litigation and enabled hundreds of southern communities to undertake the unsettling task of dismantling the dual school systems. But the record of the last
few years has been mixed. Many members of Congress had joined the rising
pressures to curtail HEW's Title VI activity-pressures which finally elicited a
response from the White House. Moreover, congressional oversight hearings
heard disturbing testimony of HEW's failure to take steps against clear disother HEW policies, constituted a clear failure to enforce the 1964 Act-in short, one more
administrative repeal of Congressional intent in the civil rights field. Adams v. Richardson,
356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973). But see Hearings on the Nomination of Stanley Pottinger To
Be Assistant Attorney General Before the Senate JudiciaryComm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
110 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
111 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
112 Id. at 31.
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crimination within individual schools and classrooms of "dismantled" dual
systems. Black students, teachers and administrators were "resegregated" or
forced from the schools in a variety of crude and subtle techniques. This socalled "second generation segregation" of students and faculty who are housed
in close proximity in some ways is even more harmful than the former practice
of separate schools. In 1970-1971, HEW reported the recorded demotion or
dismissal of 4,000 black teachers and administrators in desegregated school
districts in six southern states"
The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity concluded that the Government's failure to monitor and
prevent this so-called "second generation segregation" had "poisoned" the school
experiences of thousands of school children in 1969 and 1970 and was still a
14
problem.
E. The Early Seventies in Retrospect
The implementation of the three civil rights measures I have reviewedthe Voting Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the Title VI fund termination--sheds some light on the strengths and weaknesses of the various techniques which Congress employed in the legislation
of the 1960's. There is a broad spectrum of sanctions and mechanisms from
which Congress can select. At one extreme, of course, are penal sanctions. But
apart from the practical problems of prosecuting before a hostile jury, experience
with the early civil rights acts reveals legal difficulties of establishing criminal
intent to interfere with civil rights, even though this problem was mitigated by
the refinements of the 1968 Act. Moreover, criminal laws lack the flexibility
of equity proceedings in which the court may mold affirmative relief to fit the
circumstances. They are perhaps best reserved for deterring acts of violence
and intimidation or ending official policies of flouting regulatory schemes. In
creating civil remedies, Congress' initial preference has been to confine them to
private rights of action-with a limited role of federal participation through
intervention or the ability to bring "pattern or practice" cases. And in any case,
resort to primary jurisdiction of state agencies or federal investigation and conciliation was also provided.
Given the limit on federal litigating resources likely for the foreseeable
future, private rights of action-made meaningful by provision for attorneys'
fees and, where appropriate, class actions-permit a far broader attack on widespread discrimination than could government litigation alone. But where conciliation is unlikely to succeed in areas of entrenched discrimination, the plaintiff
must have the wherewithal and incentive to persevere in lengthy litigation
which is itself preceded by a significant waiting period while the agencies go
through the motions or add the complaint to a mountainous backlog.
As the problems of discrimination which move to the fore become more
complex, involving interwoven strands of government policy, private actions and
changing social forces, the adequacy of any approach based on case-by-case liti113 SELECT
114 Id.
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gation lessens. In different contexts, several types of more systematic methods for
achieving compliance in a reasonable manner have proven useful when energetically applied. Thus the stiff preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act
put the burden of review on the proponent of a potentially discriminatory
measure. This approach is unlikely to be used except in the most extreme situations. An alternative is the development of agency expertise backed by the
power to issue its own enforceable orders, as was unsuccessfully sought for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Similar systematic compliance
mechanisms can be built upon federal funding programs with the sanction of
fund termination. And, finally, there are carrots as well as sticks. Congress has
considerable potential to encourage communities or individual enterprises to help
reverse the trend toward an America of two divided nations. Positive incentives,
without the emotional baggage of coercive sanctions, may prove the most effective way to achieve fully the goal of equality as we move beyond the elimination
of existing barriers and seek to undo the effects of long past and recent segregation.
F. Supreme Court Nominations
This discussion of Congressional perspectives on civil rights for the last few
years would be incomplete without noting the Senate's reassertion of its role in
scrutinizing Supreme Court nominees. The opposition to no recent nominee
has focused exclusively on his attitude toward the constitutional promise of
equal treatment under law. But that inquiry has played a significant role in
several instances."'
This is a field strewn with straw men, but hopefully, they have been laid
to rest. Slogans such as "strict constructionist" or "judicial liberal" are slippery
labels at best. Nominees cannot be divided into those who would let their
personal views and predilections affect their reading of the constitution and
those who would not. Inevitably, one brings his past experience and his viewpoint to such majestic generalities as "Equal Protection of the Laws" and "Due
Process." Rather, the point is that a record of insensitivity to the Constitutional
mandate against discrimination raises legitimate questions. The nominee need
hardly have been a civil rights activist. But if his record reflects disturbing
evidence of indifference to discrimination-let alone hostility to its redress-in
the year 1973, then there are many Senators who feel compelled to search for
some evidence that he would be able to perform his constitutional duty in this
area with an open mind and fidelity to the Constitution.'

115 See Hearings on the Nomination of Clement Haynsworth To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings on the
Nomination of George Harrold Carswell To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings on Nominations of William H.
Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, 92d Cong.
1st Sess.
116 See SEN. ExEc. REP. No. 92-16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Individual Views of Senators
Bayh, Hart, Kennedy and Tunney on the nomination of William H. Rehnquist.)
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V. The Role of Congress in the Future of Civil Rights
What does the future hold for the cause of civil rights? I would be kidding
if I pretended to have easy, or even clear, answers. Perhaps all a survey of this
kind really can do is to suggest a few possibilities. Nor can one pretend that
from the vantage point of Capitol Hill that the picture looks rosy right now. In
each area I have discussed-voting, employment, housing, education--substantial opposition exists to any further advance. And even some of the progress
that has been made is threatened.
Nevertheless, let me touch on the most recent events and the immediate
prospects for congressional decision in these fields, so that I then might offer
some tentative conclusions which emerge from this survey. The first point is the
degree to which we must now concentrate on the interwoven strands of job,
school and housing conditions for minorities in the larger urban areas. The
complexity and subtlety of their mutual reinforcement requires far greater coordination of our efforts in each area than seemed necessary in the initial period
of civil rights legislation. Their interplay also requires greater recognition that
statutes outlawing discrimination must now be supplemented by increased incentives for massive programs of affirmative action. In that context, we should,
particularly encourage voluntary cooperation among neighboring communities
in each metropolitan region. Second, there is the serious threat which civil rights
controversies now pose for the judicial system as a result of our overloading
one branch of Government with responsibility for resolving these problems.
Finally, we come back to the critical role of leadership in the difficult tasks of
defusing tensions and building an atmosphere of dialogue and informed public
debate.
A. Voting
What of the future of voting rights protection for blacks and other minorities? Several amendments were offered in Congress last year, but were never
called up, which would have repealed the central safeguard now in force under
the Voting Rights Act. There may well be other efforts before the 1970 extension expires in mid-1975. Such proposals, in one form or another, probably
would follow the basic position of the administration's revision discussed in the
last lecture; that is, the position that success of the Act and changed attitudes in
the "new South" now permit a return to surveillance through specific lawsuits.
This picture suggests the severer-problems are now history, that the preclearance
procedures are now too burdensome for their meager results since few submitted
changes have been objected to, and those are allegedly isolated cases of backwater resistance."1 '
There is undeniably a "new South." Black voters are a force to be reckoned
with. Brutality and violence are no longer common reprisals for exercising
political rights. Black registration has risen dramatically from very low levels
117 Hearings.Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House judiciary Committee
on the Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (testimony of David
Norman, Asst. Attorney General for Civil Rights) (1971).
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and been accompanied by the election of numerous black officials. Efforts to
preserve the Act intact until 1975, so that we can then review the bidding, would
be met wiih charges of persecution against the South. All this will come in the
context of growing northern sensitivity about double standards in regard to discrimination.
There are really two separate issues: continued opportunity for more
blacks to register and vote; and continued protection of that vote from efforts to
dilute its impact. In regard to each, careful study of the present situation might
lead to a less sanguine view than the one I have just painted. Despite the
dramatic improvement, black registration is still disproportionately low, particularly in rural counties.'
This is so alarming because city and county officials
have an immense impact on the benefits available to or denied the local residents.
The pervasive role of discrimination is still apparent. Violence is not completely
a memory in the worst places. More common is intimidation based on the
economic dependence of rural blacks which is hard to exaggerate. This coercion
has been documented in a number of forms: eviction, firings, threatened denial
of food stamps, welfare checks and even retaliation by local draft boards. The
overall effect is still a pervasive reluctance among the less economically independent and politically active to register." 9
Nevertheless, the Act may have reached a plateau of effectiveness under
foreseeable levels of enforcement. The more educated, politically active or
economically secure have registered. The use of examiners has virtually become a
dead letter; very few have been sent South in recent years.' The prospect of this,
or any future administration, following suggestions that there be more vigorous
use of examiners where participation remains presumptively low is, I am afraid,
fairly dim. At this point, the best hope for further progress may be passage of
universal voter registration for federal elections, with incentives for its use at all
levels. A national agency would contact eligible citizens by mail and offer an
opportunity to register simply by returning an enclosed card. Numerous presidential commissions and national organizations have long recommended such a
program to increase political participation generally.' 2'
As for "preclearance," the small number of new laws objected to is misleading for several reasons: only recently has there developed clear precedent on what
changes have to be submitted; questionable standards of review have sometimes
been applied; and informal negotiation by the Justice Department often obtains
modifications before new laws are finally submitted and approved.' 2' It should
be possible at some point to revise the safeguards now in force. Perhaps Congress
could specify those kinds of changes which experience has shown suspect and
still require preclearance of proposals in those categories. Other changes in election law or political structure would be scrutinized by the Department and could
be handled through litigation if it had a discriminatory purpose or impact on
118
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the minority vote. But we should have hearings and thorough surveys of the
present situation on which to base such judgments and not act hastily.
B. Employment
Equal employment opportunity increasingly will focus on the charged issue
of affirmative action to equalize job market access. The demonology of "quotas"
has already begun to threaten the possibility for dialogue about reasonable approaches to the problem. It will be an uphill fight, to say the least, to explain to
workers concerned about job security the difference between mandatory racial
quotas and target goals, or to explain to them the moral and economic reasons
for taking some initiatives. Without leadership by business, labor and government, we face the prospect of a national controversy equalling the one over student busing. Quota requirements inexorably demand that a percentage of the
employer's work force, by category, be minority members. At the least they may
require filling all new openings preferentially until the quota is reached. Carried
to extreme, they raise the specter of actually terminating present employees to
achieve a different work force composition. 2 Affirmative action programs, on
the other hand, raise a presumption. They assume that if employers make a good
faith effort to utilize fully the black labor market and to ensure full access to
promotion for those already employed then the employer will, in the process,
come close to reasonable target goals for minority hiring and advancement. For
both factory and white-collar jobs, the employer must closely examine standards
which are not adequately job-related, or which mask the degree of subjectivity
involved in hiring and promotion. If the employer is still unable to reach the
targets and can demonstrate good-faith efforts, that is accepted. He is not
penalized." 4 It should be made especially clear that there would be no "bumping," or forced termination, of those already working. Absent past discrimination, normal seniority patterns of layoffs and reductions could apply. Nor should
an employer be forced to hire or promote those genuinely unqualified for the job
in question. The precise boundaries of Title VII relief remain unclear. Title
VII expressly bars "preferential treatment" based on the ratio of a company's
employees to the total minority population or work force of a community. But
the courts have suggested that this provision does not preclude affirmative action
within the narrower framework of the available minority job force for particular
jobs.1
In any event, apart from Title VII enforcement, the main immediate arena
for affirmative action is provided by the Government's immense role -a- contractor and as an employer itself. Its own agencies have made substantial
progress; but as the Civil Rights Commission has pointed out, there is still a long
way to go.'
Beyond that, there is the even greater potential for affirmative
action efforts spurred by Government's encouragement and incentives. Such in123
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centives can be undertaken in connection with federally funded manpower train-

ing and job Uevelopment programs.
Yet even such affirmative action is stoutly opposed by many as an illegitimate form of "racial preference" in hiring or promotion. 2 ' Can this approach be
justified in terms acceptable to those who view it as a reverse form of discrimination? The answer will depend upon whether the public can be helped to appreciate the systematically "built-in head winds" which reinforce each other as
obstacles to black employment and can be made aware of their immense social
cost. It must also be made clear that for many Americans seeking a better job,
the immediate problem is simply to penetrate the employment market, to be
known to potential employers and to learn of potential jobs, and that without
such penetration, equal opportunity pledges are worth little.
Most important, we must avoid the disaster of blacks and whites feeling
they are pitted against one another for scarce jobs. It is imperative to ensure
full employment and an expanding economy. Slicing a pie already shriveled by
the Government's economic policies will incalculably complicate acceptance of
equal employment opportunity. All the clarification and explanation and reasonableness in the world will cut little ice with a man who feels his job threatened by
forces beyond his control, and who, at the same time, is told that his company
will be making a special effort to recruit and hire minority workers.
In the short run, public service employment will probably be necessary. In
that case we must also avoid the pitfall of creating new categories of low-level
jobs which permanently come to be viewed as available to relieve the pressure of
minority economic aspirations. That could well serve as a dangerous excuse for
not fully opening up every area of economy.
And, finally, we must keep in mind the degree to which equal opportunity
in employment, as in education, is inextricably tied to the problem of housing,
through the growing problem of job relocation to the suburbs and the inability
of minority workers to locate there.
C. Education
The most pressing civil rights issue in Congress remains that of school desegregation involving student transportation-the "busing controversy." Following the decision of the Swann case in the summer of 1971, the House of Representatives moved to add three amendments to the measure for financial aid to
desegregating school districts then pending before it."' First, the use of any
federal funds for student transportation undertaken to desegregate was forbidden.
Second, both HEW and Justice Department officials were forbidden to suggest,
much less require, such busing, either in litigation or as a condition of other
federal assistance. Finally, the House bill purported to restrain federal courts
from implementing any order reassigning students on a racial basis, whether or
not busing was involved, until all appeals were exhausted. The last provision
was made ambiguous, however, by language that seemed to confine its effect to
127
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reassignments ordered to overcome "racial imbalance." It seemed hard to imagine a more self-defeating accomplishment than the first of these amendments:

the proposed ban on federal assistance to desegregating districts where busing
is involved. Members of Congress were, in the same breath, decrying the
financial burden imposed by such orders and also denying to the community the
very aid which might alleviate the strain on their pinched education budgets.
The Senate accepted these amendments in modified form, the so-called
Scott-Mansfield Compromise. As the measures were enacted in the Higher Education Act of 1972, federal funds may be used to defray the cost of busing for
desegregation under two conditions: the local authorities must request it for that
purpose, and the transportation involved must meet the Supreme Court's requirement in Swann that it neither harm the children nor impinge on the educational process." 9 Federal officials, however, are not forbidden to require such
transportation as a condition of federal assistance where it is constitutionally required. The law did retain the original House version of the court order stay
provision (the Senate would have applied it only to metropolitan orders involving novel questions of relief which it was arguably appropriate to have the
Supreme Court review first). However, in several subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court made clear that the intended scope of the stay provision was restricted to
cases in which the court had not found de jure segregation.
In the meantime, as the threat of court-ordered busing became a live
prospect for several northern communities, the pressure on Congress continued.
While Congress was considering the Higher Education Amendments, the President submitted a twin-barrelled proposal and urged speedy action: a "Moratorium Act" was to provide an interim halt of new busing until Congress acted
on the President's substantive measure, the "Equal Educational Opportunities
Act of 1972." The latter called for sharp restrictions on the judiciary's ability
to utilize busing in formulating desegregation orders.'
The Equal Opportunities Act underwent considerable revision in the House
Labor Committee and on the House floor, to the point that several of its original
sponsors voted against it, claiming it had been rendered unconstitutional. 1
As it passed the House, the bill prohibited court-ordered transportation of a
student to any school except the one next closest to his own neighborhood school.
The prohibition gives no consideration to the travel time or trip length which
might be involved, or to what amount of busing might be deemed harmful to
different age groups from kindergarten pupils to high school seniors. Nor is
weight given the present extent to which student transportation is already used
in that community. Even if the court determines there is no other way to
desegregate schools found to have been unlawfully segregated in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, it cannot employ transportation beyond the "next
closest school."
129 Id.; Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 270 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 42 U.S.C.)
(1972).
130 SELECT CommrrsE, supra note 26, at 204-05; Hearings Before House Judiciary Committee on Legislation Relating to Transportationand Assignment of School Pupils, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972); Hearings Before House Education and Labor Committee on H.R. 13915, 92d
Cong, 2d Sess. (1972).
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The Equal Educational Opportunities Act came to the Senate in September,
1972, on the eve of adjournment and after several very hectic closing weeks of
that session. Members were anxious to adjourn and take part in the remainder
of the election campaign. It was difficult enough to bring the issues into focus
through the haze of election-year rhetoric. But the Senate had not held hearings
on the House bill and the House hearings were not yet printed and available.
Several Senators, including myself, argued that a bill of this magnitude required
more than a couple of days of debate under the trip-hammer pressures to adjourn.
We indicated that when the matter had been fully aired and explored by both
sides we were willing to let the Senate vote on the measure. 2 Nevertheless, few
observers missed the opportunity to note the ironic reversal of roles. The Senate,
once the bastion against civil rights legislation, now had become the place to
preserve desegregation progress against precipitous action. And some of those
senators who had led the fight in recent years to change Rule 22, the requirement for cloture, now, in those unusual circumstances, sought to defeat cloture
and delay action on the bill until the end of the session. After three cloture
votes failed, the Senate moved on to other business and then adjourned.
In this session, the bill is likely to be resurrected as an amendment to the
extension of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which is now being
considered in the House. Looming behind this legislation is the specter of a
constitutional amendment to ban busing. Hearings on a series of resolutions to
amend the Constitution in this regard began in the Senate Judiciary Committee
in April, 1972.
This year, with the election campaigns behind us, Congress must take
another hard look and ask itself whether we really need any more legislation
dealing with this problem. Busing is at best an awkward short-run tool to achieve
desegregation. Changes in school systems are unsettling to students. Parents
concerned about education and convenience may prefer their neighborhood
schools. Such concerns are not necessarily prejudiced, and we must understand
that they are not. Legitimate concerns -mustbe weighed, as the Supreme Court
did in setting outside limits on the use of busing for school desegregation. At the
same time, we must recognize that years of hostility, suspicion and fear have
also played their role in opposition to new school assignment plans. It would be
foolish to pretend otherwise.
The fundamental question still remains: If you find a violation of a black
student's constitutional rights, do you fix it, or do you forget it and try to sweep
it under the rug of a new ghetto schoolhouse? A string of Supreme Court
decisions, unbroken by a single Justice's dissent, makes clear the obligation of a
community whose schools have been segregated by official action to undo that
effect to the maximum feasible extent in a way that works and works now. This
mandate embodies the American commitment to equal educational opportunity,
viewed in the context of our experience with racial discrimination. But its core
is the more fundamental proposition that the fourteenth amendment forbids
treating people differently because of their race or creed. That simple proposi132 Id. at 2699; 118 CONG. REc. S17193-97 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Hart).
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tion is easy to lose sight of in the welter of statistics, monographs and studies about
educational achievement. The Supreme Court, after all, did not count shade
trees or compare golf scores before it ordered integration of public parks and
golf courses. It did so, ultimately, because actions of racial separation sanctioned
by the state are, as the Court had reminded us, "... by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."'3 3
The hardest question is this: Can Congress tell the courts that they cannot
remedy violations of the fourteenth amendment? One argument advanced is
that Congress' power to regulate the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
permits it to limit or prescribe the remedies available as well, even though
Congress could not limit the constitutional right itself. However, this distinction
between rights and remedies breaks down at some point, if in a particular situation the remedy denied is the only means of vindicating the right. In that case
to deny the remedy is to deny the right itself, or render it illusory. The bill's supporters also rely upon Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the amendment by "appropriate legislation." But the Supreme
Court has indicated that section 5 only empowers Congress to protect minority
rights not to dilute or diminish them. The fabric of the fourteenth amendment
comes to Congress already sanforized. We can iron out wrinkles in its enforcement, but we cannot shrink the mantle of its protection.' 4
As for the prospect of a constitutional amendment, most of the pending
resolutions go beyond a ban on student transportation. They would make it unconstitutional to require any student assignment on the basis of race, even to a
walk-in school. Do we really wish to make the United States Constitution an
express instrument for the perpetuation of segregation? I hope the American
people will think long and hard on that one. If we are going to do that, why
confuse things with a new amendment? We could be more direct and simply
rewrite the fourteenth amendment to read for all the world to see:
Nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws . ..except Black, Spanish American and
Indian schoolchildren.
D. Housing
One effect of the busing controversy has been to bring our attention back
to the more fundamental problem of racial and economic polarization between
the nation's central cities and their suburbs. Segregation is the residential pattern
in America, and it is increasing. We know the suburbs received a dramatic
influx of whites in the past few decades while the central cities became increasingly poor and black. The trends are clear and ominous: isolated affluent
suburbs encircling blighted inner cities. 1' Employment, too, has made its exodus
133 I-Brabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
134 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. 10; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
249 n. 31 (1970) (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
135 SELECT CoMmrrrEm, supra note 26, at 247.
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from our cities. Almost 80 percent of the new jobs created in major metropolitan
areas during the sixties were located in the suburbs.' 86
Of course, there is also the basic problem of simply providing enough
decent low- and moderate-income housing anywhere for our less affluent citizens.
Tackling that job alone, in the face of recurrent program failures and scandals,
seems hopeless enough for the foreseeable future without trying to make a dent
in residential segregation as well." 7 Still, the dispersal of low-income housing,
and access to the regular real estate market by participants in expanded subsidy
programs, is one of the few broad avenues for breaking down the racial and
economic barriers which threaten to divide us completely into two nations. The
interlocking practice and policies of state and local governments, federal agencies
and private interests which have promoted and perpetuated these divisions are
also well known:
-FHA policies to ensure neighborhood stability and "red-lining" by
financial institutions and insurers;
-urban renewal and highway programs creating new ghettos in their
wake and cutting them off from the rest of the city and its suburbs;
-local zoning laws, building codes and realtor practices which block
low- and moderate-income housing and hinder black home buyers who
seek regular housing;
-location

of large federal installations outside the central city.

Direct refusal to sell or discriminatory brokerage and mortgage practices are
amenable to litigation under state laws and the 1968 Act. But that is the tip of
the iceberg.
How can Congress make a major impact in the overall problem of separatism? Several civil rights organizations have urged the Government to exercise
greater authority and take more vigorous action under Title VI of the 1964 Act
as well as the 1968 Housing Act.1 8 Where a city seeks public housing funds, the
Government can try to ensure that the site selection and the size of the project
will not perpetuate residential segregation. The Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development is obligated to do that under the Housing Act. It is not only important to disperse public housing built within large cities away from the central
ghetto areas, but it is also important that suburban communities willing to
participate in federal programs not be overwhelmed with such an influx of lowincome housing that the racial and economic concentration creates a new suburban ghetto." 9
136
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NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 6 at
SELECT COMMrrTE, supra note 26, at 249-51.

256-60.

138 Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Education Opportunity, Part 5
De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 Hearings].
139 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 254-55.
--

JVol. 49:5]

NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS LECTURES

41

The situation is different, and the Government's powers less clear, in the case
of the suburbs or smaller cities which do not seek federal assistance for public
housing or participate in federal subsidy programs. Right now, this is the main
area of controversy over what power HUD has under existing law, and whether
Congress should provide additional leverage with more explicit statutes. Should
HUD, for example, cut off all urban development grants-for sewer and water,
or roads-if a community zones out low-income housing, even where an intent to
discriminate racially cannot be proven? Scholarly arguments have been offered
for still moving in such instances under Title VI of the 1964 Act or the 1968
14 1
Housing Act. However, the area is hardly free from legal uncertainties.
Congress might provide more explicit authority, but there are other approaches
which may prove more fruitful in the long run. The Government can exert
leverage by locating its own facilities only in communities which assure adequate
housing opportunities for every economic group in the installation's work force.
Senator Abraham Ribicoff has offered a bill extending this approach to impose
a similar obligation on all government contractors and their affiliates. That
would cover a very substantial fraction of American industry.141
Ultimately, however, the central question in the next few years will be the
degree to which we should continue to rely on negative sanctions of denying
funds and terminating benefits. Has the time come instead for greater stress on
positive incentives to encourage action and to meet the legitimate concerns of
communities which might participate in voluntary programs for integrated housing and schools? The Senate made a start in this latter direction in 1971 when it
passed the Quality Integrated Education Act. President Nixon had proposed
expenditures of $1.5 billion both for aid to desegregating school districts and
assistance to voluntary efforts undertaken to reduce racial isolation in schools not
under court order or an HEW Title VI plan. The Quality Integrated Education Act sought to spell out how the money for voluntary initiatives might be
spent. Set-asides were prescribed for interdistrict cooperation, educational parks,
development of community relations groups to make integration projects a success, and bilingual education. The central feature was the development of individual "quality integrated schools" with the prospect for stability and with
adequate planning and funding to carry out integration under auspicious circumstances. A modified version of the bill was accepted by the House and incorporated into the President's Emergency School Aid Act, which is now law.
However, the administration's failure to fund even this tentative beginning
beyond negligible amounts has made the program virtually a dead letter for the
42
present. It should be given life.'

Congress has also begun to explore the possibilities of utilizing large-scale
incentive programs to engage more communities in voluntary efforts to reduce
racial isolation in both education and housing. We are well aware of the apprehensions which individual communities have expressed about accepting a
large-scale housing project or a very large number of educationally disad140 1970 Hearings,supra note 138.
141 117 CoNG. REc. S6613 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1971) '(remarks of Senator Ribicoff).
142 SELECT CommrrTEE, supra note 26, ch. 17.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October 1973]

vantaged pupils in cooperative arrangements with inner-city schools. The suburban community might fear it would be overburdened financially with greater
demands for public services in relation to its tax revenues. It may be concerned
about maintaining the desirable socioeconomic mixture of students in its schools,
a goal which studies suggest is also needed for maximum benefit to students from
less educationally advantaged backgrounds. There is also the problem of any
one community fearing white flight to neighboring suburbs which have not accepted any low-income housing and are not participating in a cooperative student
placement program. The most promising answer may be to use special revenue
sharing grants or other additional incentives which can pay the costs of lowdensity attractive housing and well-run quality integrated schools. Such programs
should provide maximum encouragement and assistance for the kind of "fair
share" programs such as the one pioneered by the Miami Valley Regional
Planning Association, the metropolitan area group for Dayton, Ohio. 4 If each
community accepts a so-called "fair share" of the federally assisted housing
within a metropolitan area, none will be overwhelmed by a massive influx of
projects. And there will remain few white havens. The federal government
could encourage metropolitan councils of governments or other regional bodies
to plan for the distribution of low- and moderate-income housing. Each community would be expected to take a sufficient share of the housing to enable the
regional planning agency to meet its goals consistent with school capacity, public
services, proximity to employment and commuter transportation, recreational
facilities and other criteria for each community. And Congress should foot the
bill.
Exploring this type of approach in recent Senate testimony, Father Hesburgh noted that it
...has the greatest potential for meeting the housing problems of lowerincome families in a way that would contribute to the social and economic
health of the entire metropolitan area . . . for doing away with the irrationality of the existing system by which federally subsidized housing programs are operated, of making order out of what is now little short of

chaos."4 4

At some point, the same group of cooperating governments could also explore the
possibility of interdistrict school cooperation along similar lines and within welldefined limits on the amount of transportation involved for the students.
Hopefully, then, Congress will move positively to promote more opportunity
in housing, employment and education. That will restore Congress' rightful role
of sharing responsibility with the courts for the achievement of equality, rather
than leaving the courts as isolated scapegoats or, worse yet, joining the attack.
This is particularly important because the recent antibusing bills not only pose
a threat to the enforcement of constitutional rights, but also threaten the independence of the judiciary itself.
The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity ha,
143
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warned of the cost we pay for the sloganeering in debate over busing. "The focus
of national debate on the misleading issues of 'massive busing' and 'racial balance' has contributed -to deteriorating public confidence in the justice of constitu45
tional requirements and in the essential fairness of our judicial system."
Burke Marshall put it more bluntly when he offered the disturbing reminder that
many Americans now feel "the Federal judiciary has suddenly become peopled
with a bunch of wild men arbitrarily ordering indiscriminate and massive
busing."
The situation is reminiscent of debates over crime legislation in the second
half of the 1960's. Instead of busing, the controversy then was over court
decisions on the rights of criminal defendants. But as it is now, the effective
thrust was an assault on the independence of the judiciary and an effort to
undermine public confidence in their integrity. A similar effort was made then to
blame the courts for difficulties caused by neglect of our unfinished agenda. 48
In some ways, the judiciary is well suited to the role of moral leadership. It can
justify social obligations by appealing to the rule of law and the overarching
precepts of the Constitution. And the courts are, or should be, above the frictions of national politics. But the judiciary's role as legal arbiter is also its
weakness. Courts must address the precise issues presented and adjust the immediate interests of those before it. Courts can take the stability of possible solutions into account, but they cannot shape the larger social framework in which
that stability will be tested. Acting on each case, a court cannot defend itself or
hold press conferences to clear up misunderstandings about decisions. While a
court of equity has broad, flexible remedial powers, they do not approach the legislature's powers to provide subsidies, shape incentives and provide leadership
over a long period. There is one other thing the courts cannot do. They cannot
pass the buck. The inadequate response from Congress and the President on
these problems over the years has led us to the perplexing pass in which congressional efforts have been overtaken by the inherent dynamics of constitutional
litigation, a process which the courts cannot halt for our political convenience.
If Congress and the Executive shoulder their "fair share" of the responsibility
to promote equal opportunity, we may avoid the danger of placing too much
responsibility on the judiciary for bringing blacks and whites together. We would
do well to remember the observation of Judge Learned Hand, who wrote:
In a society where the spirit of moderation is lost, no court can save it.
A society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save.
And in a society which thrusts upon its courts the responsibility for the
nurture of that spirit of moderation, that society will, in the long run,
perish.
Like most fields of controversial policy, the civil rights arena has been viewed
by the public largely in terms of vivid images and simple slogans. In the days
of the marches for service at lunch counters, of snarling police dogs and upraised
145
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billy clus, these helped to mobilize public opinion behind the effort to pass
legislation. Now we must admit the same process has facilitated misunderstanding and distortion of what the courts, or the Congress, seek to do. The unknown
is a fertile breeding ground for exaggerated rumors and dire predictions. Anxieties can' be magnified many times by misleading politicial rhetoric about
"quotas" or "massive busing to achieve racial balance"-a rare and unusual
animal well known to every American, yet still to be found in any actual court
order. The public has little interest in esoteric debate about the Congress's constitutional powers to interfere with the judiciary. It can, however, readily
comprehend superficially appealing arguments that since the "Constitution is
color-blind," affirmative relief is illegal. That sophistry would mean that the
courts must also be color-blind to the exclusion of racial analysis which identifies
illegal segregation in the first place. Obviously the courts and Congress must
be color conscious in searching out discrimination; just as clearly, solutions to
undo that discrimination must take race into account.
Nonetheless, as the issues become particularly complex and subtle in each
of the areas I have reviewed, the difficulty of fashioning legislative responses is
more than matched by the increased difficulty of arousing the public conscience
and convincing those of good will that the problems of institutionalized discrimination require redress. Without strong leadership to help explain these considerations, there is danger of a self-defeating hysteria which would doom even
the most reasonable and carefully implemented efforts. But we also should not
kid ourselves that the present public mood and lack of support for new civil
rights initiatives are simply a matter of misunderstanding and lack of information.
We in the North are, as my southern colleagues often remind us, "getting close
to home." Many feel or perceive their most basic interests threatened: their
jobs, their home investments, their children's education. Lower- and middleincome white families feel unfairly put upon, asked to pay the price for the rest
of society so that we can catch up in the areas of unequal opportunity.
The tangible concerns which underlie this opposition cannot be maligned
or lightly dismissed. Unfounded fears must be met with facts. Legitimate
interests must be taken into account and met with a meaningful response. The
immediate acid test is to convince Americans that adequately funded school
desegregation with reasonable amounts of student transportation where necessary can work to the benefit of all our children. In some cities the students have
already shown us this. Once the television cameras move on, Americans in general will realize this, and we must tell them.
Without positive leadership from our highest officials, the task may well
prove hopeless. But we must try. There are numerous excuses we can use to
defer or avoid further efforts. The leaders of the civil rights movement and their
allies in Congress are far less certain or unanimous about what steps should next
be taken than they were a decade ago. A lower estimation of our own omniscience will, I am sure, prove healthy. It is not a justification for inaction.

Father Hesburgh wrote recently in a leading newspaper:
There is a feeling among the poor and the powerless today that some-
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how the firm commitment just isn't there, pr that it has drifted or weakened.
Even good people are losing heart.
Americans like quick victories. We tended to lose interest and concern when the brave new rhetoric concerning equal opportunities and civil
rights in the sixties led us into the stormy waters of the seventies.
As one who can, with some experience, testify to the growing unpopularity
of this cause today, may I say that it was never more important to our
to the growing realizanation and to the world that we rededicate ourselves
7
tion of equality of opportunity in America.To these words, I would only add, "Amen."
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